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Plaintiffs/Appellants Charlie W. Harrison and Trena Harrison (the 
“Harrisons”) appeal from the final Order and Judgment by the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Grand County, State of Utah, quieting title, in Defendants/ 
Appellees Spah Family, Ltd., Stan Holland and Page Holland (collectively the 
“Hollands”), to a 40-foot-wide easement by prescription across land owned by the 
Harrisons.  The Order and Judgment, entered June 11, 2018, incorporate the trial 
court’s July 28, 2017 summary judgment ruling that, as a matter of law, the 
Hollands had satisfied all elements of an easement by prescription across the 
Harrisons’ property—the only issue for trial to the jury being the location and 
scope of the easement.1  A copy of the court’s June 11, 2018 Order and Judgment 
(R. 1285-89) is included in the Appendix as Attachment 1; a copy of the court’s 
July 28, 2017 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 521-24) is included in 
the Appendix as Attachment 2. 
The facts before the trial court, however, demonstrated that the Hollands’ 
claim to a prescriptive easement fails.  The Hollands’ use of the road across the 
Harrisons’ property was not open, adverse and uninterrupted for the prescriptive 
period.  Use was initially permissive, and never shown to have become adverse.  
                                           
1 The Hollands also asserted a claim for damage to two gates on their property.  The jury 
returned a verdict of only $300 on this claim, and no appeal was taken therefrom.   
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Before the 20-year prescriptive period expired, the Harrisons challenged the 
Hollands’ use of the road and summoned law enforcement to prevent them from 
using the road.   
Even if the Hollands were able to demonstrate prescriptive use by clear and 
convincing evidence, they offered no competent evidence of its historic course and 
scope.  Due to improper instruction though, the jury imposed a 40-foot easement 
on the Harrisons’ property along a centerline established by a 2016 survey of the 
road existing at that time – a burden on the Harrison property which had never 
existed.  In fact, the width of the historical use of the road was 8 feet.   
Based on the foregoing, this Court should remand this case for entry of 
judgment in favor of the Harrisons, or for a retrial. 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR APPEAL 
This is an appeal from final orders and the judgment of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court for Grand County.  The Utah Supreme Court retained jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).   
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW  
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment that the 
Hollands had met all the elements necessary to establish an easement by 
prescription and specifically, whether the Hollands made continuous, adverse and 
uninterrupted use of the Harrisons’ property for a period of 20 years or more, even 
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though the Harrisons summoned law enforcement which interrupted the 
prescriptive period and caused a revocation of the Harrisons’ acquiescence.  
(Preserved at R. 262-281, 564-576, 604-610, 1320-1368, 1389.)  Review of orders 
granting summary judgment are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference 
to the trial court’s ruling.  Federal Capital Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, ¶ 7, 384 
P.3d 221.  All facts and resulting inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Robinson v. Jones Waldo Holbrook 
& McDonough, PC, 2016 UT App 34, ¶ 11, 369 P.3d 119. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law on 
summary judgment, that the Hollands’ use of the Harrisons’ property was adverse, 
even though their predecessors-in-interest used the road with the express 
permission from the developer for a limited purpose, and even though no 
conversion to an adverse use was shown.  (Preserved at R. 262-281, 564-576, 604-
610, 1320-1368.)  Review of orders granting summary judgment are reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court’s ruling.  Libby, 2016 UT 41, 
¶ 7.  All facts and resulting inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Robinson, 2016 UT App 34, ¶ 11.   
3. Whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that the 
course and scope of the prescriptive easement is measured and limited by the 
historic use thereof.  (Preserved at R. 930, 1748-1750.)  Jury instructions, being 
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statements of applicable law, are reviewed for correctness, affording the trial court 
no deference.  Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 14, 29 P.3d 638; Child v. Gonda, 
972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998).  
4. Whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence from the 
Hollands’ retained expert, Lucas Blake, that the centerline of the easement by 
prescription could be estimated by using the centerline of the broadened and 
altered roadway as it existed in 2016.  (Preserved at R. 690-700, 811-820.)  A trial 
court’s decision on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 10, 137 P.3d 726. 
5. Whether the trial court improperly excluded rebuttal evidence from 
the Harrisons’ retained expert, Bradley Bunker, regarding the shortcomings of the 
survey prepared by Lucas Blake, notwithstanding Mr. Blake’s failure to (1) consult 
historic data concerning use of the roadway crossing the Harrisons’ property at any 
time before the autumn of 2016, and (2) locate a centerline of the roadway from 
historic data rather than from measuring to the centerline of the road existing in 
2016, which had been widened by the Hollands at that time.  (Preserved at 
R. 1821-1823, 1827-1834.2)  A trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 10. 
                                           
2 The Approved Statement of Proceedings as to Which Transcript is Unavailable, issued 
January 10, 2019, is included in the Appendix as Attachment 3.  This Court granted the 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts and Marshaling of Evidence 3 
A. Property Ownership 
1. The Harrisons are owners in fee simple of a parcel of real property 
located at 639 Spotlight Hollow Road, Castle Valley, Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
SE1/4NE1/4SW1/4, LESS the West 66.0 feet of the 
SE1/4NE1/4SW1/4, Section 35, T25S, R24E, SLBM.  (Also known as 
Parcel “H” on the plat recorded as an attachment to the Restrictive 
Covenants recorded 11/17/1994 in Book 470 at Page 244.) 
TOGETHER with a right-of-way for ingress and egress over an 
existing road across the N1/2SW1/4 OF Section 35, T25S R24E, 
SLBM, said road runs from the N line of the N1/2SW1/4 to the S line 
of the N1/2 SW1/4 and provides access to the S1/2SW1/4 of Section 
35, T25S, R24E, SLM 
TOGETHER with a 20 foot easement on the North boundary of Parcel 
G and any other access rights which may (sic) established by the Plat 
recorded as an attachment to the Restrictive Covenants recorded 
11/17/1994 in Book 470 at Page 244. 
Amended Complaint, ¶ 10 (R. 10); Answer and Counterclaim, ¶ 2 (R. 19). 
The Harrisons’ property was designated Parcel H on the plat map of a subdivision 
known as Willow Basin Subdivision, created by Janice Hawley incident to 
                                                                                                                                        
Harrisons’ motion to supplement the record, filed pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, on February 6, 2019.  See Order.   
 
3 The majority of the Harrisons’ assignments of error herein go to the court’s rulings on 
dispositive motions and improper instruction of the jury, which, as noted above, are 
reviewable for correctness.  Nevertheless, the Harrisons include herewith a marshaling of 
all evidence supporting the judgment below, to the extent presented at trial.  
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Restrictive Covenants recorded November 17, 1994 as Entry No. 432742, 
Book 470, Page 244, Grand County Recorder’s Office.  (R. 48, 186.) 
2. On May 23, 2008, the Harrisons took title to Parcel H by Warranty 
Deed from Janice Hawley, which was recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s 
Officer as Entry No. 486320, Book 728, Page 588.  Amended Complaint, ¶ 14 (R. 
12); Answer and Counterclaim, ¶ 1 (R. 19).   
3. Defendant/Appellee SPAH Family, Ltd. Partnership (“SPAH”) holds 
title to a parcel of land immediately to the north of Parcel H, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at the Center 1/4 Corner of Section 35, Township 25 South, 
Range 24 East, SLB&M, and proceeding thence with the Center 1/4 
line South 0 10' East 661.0 feet to a Corner, thence North 89 51' 
West 589.0 feet to a Corner, thence North 0 05' West 660.9 feet to a 
Corner, thence with the Center 1/4 line South 89 51' East 588.0 feet 
to the point of beginning, Grand County, Utah. 
 
TOGETHER with a non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress 
20.0 feet on each side of the following described centerline:  
BEGINNING at a point which bears South 86 34' East 1938.0 feet 
from the West 1/4 Corner Section 35, T25S, R24E, SLB&M, and 
proceeding thence with said centerline South 45 00' East 161.2 feet, 
thence South 0 05' East 436.2 feet to the terminus of this centerline 
description. 
 
SUBJECT to a non-exclusive easement over and across the West 40.0 
feet and also a 10 foot wide access easement to a spring that extends 
Northerly to the Northwesterly area from the roadway. 
 





(R. 406-07.)  On October 17, 1997, SPAH took title to the above-described 
property (designated on the official plat of Willow Basin Subdivision as 
“Parcel A”), by Special Warranty Deed from Stan Holland and Page Holland, 
which was recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 442633, 
Book 509, Pages 427-428.  Deposition of Stan Holland (“Holland Depo”) at 13:15-
25 (R. 377) & Special Warranty Deed, attached to the Holland Depo as Exhibit 5 
(R. 406-07).     
4. Stan Holland and Page Holland had previously taken title to Parcel A 
by Warranty Deed from Manuel Torres and Ginger Torres dated August 9, 1996, 
recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 437364, Book 490, 
Page 83.  Holland Depo at 10:4-11 (R. 376) & Warranty Deed, attached to the 
Holland Depo as Exhibit 4 (R. 405).   
5. Manuel Torres and Ginger Torres, the Hollands’ grantors, obtained 
title to Parcel H from Janice Hawley by Warranty Deed dated February 22, 1996, 
recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 436016, Book 484, 
Page 103.  Counterclaim, ¶ 8 (R. 21) & Warranty Deed (R. 50).    
6. The relative positions of Parcels A and H in the Willow Basin 




B. Permissive Use 
6. Janice Hawley was the original owner of all property within Willow 
Basin subdivision.  Declaration of Janice Kirk Gustafson (formerly Janice Hawley) 
(“Hawley Decl.”), ¶ 2 (R. 309). 
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7. In November of 1994 Keogh Land Surveying prepared a subdivision 
plat of Willow Basin subdivision at Janice Hawley’s request.  Hawley Decl., ¶ 3 
(R. 310). 
8. As illustrated by the above survey, the subdivision consisted of eight 
lots, each accessible by roads drawn within the subdivision, all as reflected on the 
recorded subdivision plat.  Id., ¶ 4 (R. 310).   
9. It was always Ms. Hawley’s intention that the lots within the 
subdivision be accessed by the road shown on the plat map.  Hawley Decl., ¶ 5 (R. 
310). 
10. After all necessary government agencies had approved the Willow 
Basin subdivision, Janice Hawley retained Randy Day and Raymond Tibbets of 
Canyon Country Realty to list and market the lots.  Id., ¶ 6 (R. 310). 
11. Janice Hawley then entered into an agreement with Manuel and 
Ginger Torres, under which she conveyed all of her right, title and interest in and to 
Parcel A of the subdivision to the Torreses in exchange for Manuel Torres’ 
construction of a cabin for her on Parcel G, a property which she had retained.  Id., 
¶ 7 (R. 310).   
12. Ms. Hawley then became aware that, at some time before or after the 
summer of 1996, Canyon Country Realty or Keogh Land Surveying arranged for 
the grading of a narrow road connecting Parcel A with adjacent public roads by 
15 
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means of a road looping over a portion of Parcel H, title to which she had retained.  
Id., ¶ 8 (R. 310).   
13. It was Ms. Hawley’s understanding that the purpose of the road 
crossing Parcel H was not a permanent access to Parcel A, but a means of 
permitting the Torreses to take prospective purchasers to Parcel A for marketing the 
other parcels.  Id., ¶ 9 (R. 310). 
14. While Ms. Hawley neither knew of nor authorized the creation of the 
road in advance, its use thereafter was for the purposes stated above, and was 
pursuant to permission from her.  Id., ¶ 10 (R. 311). 
15. Randy Day of Canyon Country Realty recalled that the road was used 
by him and his company, with Janice Hawley’s express permission.  Deposition of 
Randy Day (“Day Depo”) at 19:3-5; 32:19-33:25; 20:6 (R. 330, 333) & Exhibit 1 
(R. 402).   
C. Interruption of Consent to Use 
16. The Hollands were not aware that there was property available for 
sale within the Willow Basin subdivision until shortly before August 9, 1996, the 
date on which they acquired title to Parcel A.  Holland Depo at 10:12-23 (R. 376).  
The Hollands’ alleged prescriptive use of any portion of the Harrisons’ property, 
therefore, did not commence until August 9, 1996 or later.  Id.   
16 
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17. Charlie Harrison notified Stan Holland, well before August 2016 that 
he forbade the Hollands’ use of the road across Parcel H as a means to access 
Parcel A.  Charlie Harrison Declaration (“Harrison Decl.”), ¶ 11 (R. 304).   
18. Moreover, Page Holland contacted the Sheriff’s Office on 
September 20, 2016 to report that Charlie Harrison “parked a Dozer in the 
driveway of the access road blocking their property.”  Sheriff’s Report, p. 2 (R. 
584).   
19. The Sheriff’s Report included a Voluntary Statement form, filled out 
by hand by Page Holland and signed under oath.  See Sheriff’s Report, pp. 4-10 (R. 
586-92).  The Voluntary Statement form contains the following representation by 
Defendant Page Holland, concerning, among other things, events in June of 2016: 
Father’s Day weekend (June 17, 18 or 19) Charlie Harrison and Stan 
Holland (my husband) argued about rights to an access road in 
Willow Basin.  Deputy Black called out – talked to both parties.  We 
received a written letter dated August 18 from Charlie Harrison’s 
attorney (Jessica Wilde, Jones, Waldo & Holbrook) stating we had no 
right to use the small portion of the road accessing our cabin. 
Sheriff’s Report, Voluntary Statement Form (R. 586); emphasis added.     
20. At trial, the Hollands offered the following evidence concerning the 
dispute over their use of the road across the Harrison Property: 
a. The dispute over the Hollands’ use of the road across the 
Harrison property commenced in “the summer of 2016.”  Trial Record 
(“TR”) at 96:15-20 (R. 1521).     
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b. It arose on Father’s Day 2016, when the Hollands were 
planning a family party on the Holland property.  TR at 97:23-98:6 (R. 1522-
23).     
21. At trial the court prohibited the Harrisons’ counsel from inquiring into 
the altercation of June 2016 between the parties over the Hollands’ use of the road 
across the Harrisons’ property.  TR at 144:22-145:13 (R. 1569-70).   
D. Course and Scope of Historic Use 
22. At the time the Hollands acquired their interest in Parcel A in late 
1996, the road traversing a portion of Parcel H (apparently placed for access to 
power utility poles) was one blade width, or eight feet, in width and, in places, was 
impassable without an off-road vehicle.  Harrison Decl., ¶ 10 (R. 304); Day Depo 
at 18:25-19:2 (R. 290).   
23. At trial, Mr. Day confirmed that at the time the Hollands acquired 
Parcel A, the road traversing Parcel H was one blade width, or eight feet, in width.  
TR at 229:23-230:30 (R. 1654-55).   
24. At no point before or during trial did the Hollands adduce any 
testimony or other evidence whatsoever controverting the 8-foot width of the road 
in August of 1996.  The Hollands offered only the following:  
a. Page Holland testified that the road across the Harrison 
property, as it existed in 1996 when the Hollands acquired their property, 
18 
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was a narrow, single-lane road, like others in the subdivision – though wide 
enough for her to drive a Jeep Cherokee pulling a tent trailer with her 
husband following in the pickup truck pulling a horse trailer.  TR at 108:11-
109:12 (R. 1533-34).  The Hollands did not measure its width at the time.  
TR at 109:2-3 (R. 1534). 
b. Stan Holland confirmed that, at the time the Hollands first 
acquired their property, he drove a truck and horse trailer over the road 
crossing the Harrison property.  TR at 120:20-121:11 (R. 1545-46). 
25. After acquiring their property, the Hollands built a cabin thereon, and 
ran construction and cement trucks over the road crossing the Harrison property.  
TR at 133:23-134:19 (R. 1558-59).  
26. According to Stan Holland’s trial testimony, the road across the 
Harrison property was leveled and widened by Charlie Harrison after the 
Harrisons’ acquisition of the Harrison property in 2008.  TR at 111:15-22 (R. 
1536). 
27. At trial, the Hollands’ retained expert surveyor, Lucas Blake, testified 
that: 
a. He was familiar with the Willow Basin Subdivision area 
because he had been hired by Page Holland to prepare a survey.  TR at 
150:14-25 (R. 1575). 
19 
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b. At Page Holland’s direction, he prepared a survey of the 
roadway across the Harrison property – as it existed in 2016 – which was 
introduced as Exhibit 3.  TR at 150:23-151:8 (R. 1575-76). 
c. The survey was prepared by “estimat[ing] the edge of the dirt 
road” which they “shot . . . coming up to the property, actually all the way 
up to the top . . . .”  TR at 152:14-22 (R. 1577). 
d. From this, Mr. Blake prepared a legal description consisting of 
the metes and bounds of the existing road at the time the survey was created. 
TR at 152:23-153:2 (R. 1577-78).   
e. Mr. Blake could not testify as to a uniform width of the road, it 
being wider and narrower in various locations as illustrated on Exhibit 31. 
TR at 153:25-154:11 (R. 1578-79). 
f. From his 2016 metes and bounds description, Mr. Blake worked 
backward to create a centerline.  TR at 154:12-14 (R. 1579). 
g. Page Holland first contacted Mr. Blake to perform the survey in 
October of 2016.  TR at 156:13-21 (R. 1581).   
28. In cross-examination, Mr. Blake acknowledged the following: 
a. Prior to visiting the property in October of 2016 in response to 
Defendant Page Holland’s request, Mr. Blake had never been to the property 
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(TR at 157:10-12 (R. 1582)); neither had he visited any other Willow Basin 
properties (TR at 157:13-15 (R. 1582)); 
b. Before preparing the survey admitted as Exhibit 31, Mr. Blake 
had done no other survey work on the properties at issue herein (TR at 
158:22-25 (R. 1583)); and 
c. In preparing his opinion, Mr. Blake had looked at no other 
documents or data indicating what the road might have looked like in years 
past, including historic photographs, prior surveys or any information at all 
as to where the road went or how large it was in 1996 (TR at 159:5-16 (R. 
1584)).  
Procedural History 
The Harrisons filed this action before the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
Grand County, State of Utah, on September 15, 2016.  In their Complaint the 
Harrisons sought a declaration that they were the owners of an express easement of 
access over property owned by the Hollands and servicing the Harrisons’ property 
(owned to the south of the Holland property); they also sought a declaration that 
they owned their own property free and clear of any claim of right, title or interest 
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(including prescriptive easement rights) by the Hollands.  (R. 1-5.)  Finally, they 
sought damages and injunctive relief for trespass across their property.  (R. 4.)4   
The Hollands counterclaimed on September 25, 2016.  They sought a 
declaration that they held prescriptive easement rights across an existing road on 
the Harrisons’ property, for purposes of accessing their property to the north 
thereof; the Hollands also sought a declaration that the Harrisons had no rights (or 
limited rights) across the express easement passing over the Hollands’ property.  
Finally, the Hollands claimed damages to two of their gates that blocked access to 
and from both the Hollands’ and Harrisons’ properties.  (R. 19-32.) 
On April 19, 2017, following completion of fact discovery, the Harrisons 
moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that, as a matter of 
law, they held express easement rights across the Hollands’ property.  (R. 173-
222.)  Shortly thereafter, on April 28, 2017, the Hollands moved for summary 
judgment on all claims asserted in their Counterclaim.  (R. 223-49.)   
A hearing was held on July 11, 2017.  (R. 509-11.)  By order dated July 28, 
2017, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that:  
a. The Harrisons held good and marketable title in and to an 
express, nonexclusive easement for access, 40 feet in width, along the 
western border of the Hollands’ property, as illustrated on the plat map 
                                           
4 The Harrisons amended their Complaint on September 23, 2016, to make certain factual 
corrections in their claims.  (R. 10-16). 
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recorded with the restrictive covenants applicable to the Willow Basin 
Subdivision on November 17, 1994, and were entitled to make all reasonable 
use of that easement for access to and from their own property; and 
b. The Hollands had met all of the necessary elements of a claim 
of easement by prescription along all or some portion of the roadway 
crossing the Harrisons’ property but that the course, scope or extent of that 
easement were issues for trial.   
(R. 521-24.)  The court denied the remainder of the Hollands’ motion for summary 
judgment.  (R. 523.)  Incident to its ruling, the court held as a matter of law that – 
notwithstanding the declaration of Janice Hawley (the developer) that (1) the road 
across Harrisons’ property was not included in the subdivision plat as an access 
road; (2) the road had been cut for the sole purpose of accessing the Holland 
property for marketing purposes; and (3) was being used with her express 
permission – the Hollands’ use of that road was not permissive.  (R. 521-23; 1372-
1373.) 
On October 9, 2017, the Harrisons moved the court to reconsider its 
summary judgment order on the Hollands’ claim of easement by prescription 
across the Harrisons’ property, noting that newly-uncovered evidence established 
that Charlie Harrison had confronted Stan Holland on the use of the road crossing 
the Harrisons’ property before the expiration of the 20-year prescriptive period 
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being claimed by Hollands; and further, the Harrisons had summoned law 
enforcement to prevent Hollands’ use of the road, but that law enforcement had 
declined to intervene.  (R. 564-92.)  At a scheduling conference held on 
November 14, 2017, the court refused even to permit argument on the Harrisons’ 
motion to reconsider, summarily denying the motion without explanation.  
(R. 1389.)   
On March 2, 2018, the Harrisons filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
expert testimony of Lucas Blake.  Mr. Blake, a licensed surveyor, proposed to offer 
testimony as to the course and extent of the road crossing the Harrisons’ property 
when he first examined it in 2016 – rather than its course and scope during the 20-
year prescriptive period preceding the filing of this action.5  (R. 690-700.)  By 
order dated April 5, 2018, the court denied the Harrisons’ motion and in its ruling, 
stated the following:   
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine is denied.  Plaintiffs have wasted the time 
of both the court and opposing counsel with this motion.  It is plain 
that the purpose of the survey is to provide the court with the legal 
description of a pathway on the ground in the event that the evidence 
establishes that there is a legal right of way along that pathway.  It 
has never been necessary – and indeed must not become necessary – 
to hire only a surveyor familiar with the historical use of every 
centimeter of a claimed easement.  Plaintiffs make an elaborate effort 
to set up a straw man which they very convincingly – and not 
surprisingly – knock down, but all of their arguments completely miss 
the point.  If defendants establish the existence of a right of way, it 
                                           
5 Any prescriptive easement crossing the Harrisons’ property was limited to its historic 
use during the prescriptive period. see Argument, Point III.   
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will then be very useful to the court to have a metes and bounds 
description of that right of way so that a judgment can be entered 
which reduces the likelihood of future litigation.   
 
(R. 839 (emphasis added).) 
A week before trial, on May 7, 2018, the Harrisons submitted their proposed 
jury instructions to the court.  (R. 896-988.)  The Harrisons’ proposed Jury 
Instruction No. 31 addressed the historic use of a prescriptive easement:   
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT LIMITED TO THAT 
REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR HISTORIC USE 
A prescriptive easement, if established, is limited by the nature 
and extent of its use during the prescriptive period.  Stated differently, 
the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its 
historic use during the prescriptive period (which, as I previously 
stated, is not less than 20 years).  SPAH Family Limited and Hollands 
must therefore prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the location, 
width, course, and use which have been made of their prescriptive 
easement over Harrisons’ property for the prescriptive period. 
(R. 930.)  The Harrisons also proposed Jury Instruction No. 32, dealing with 
easement by prescription not being established by permissive use:  
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION NOT ESTABLISHED BY 
PERMISSIVE USE 
As I previously instructed, a claim of prescriptive easement 
depends on “adverse use” of the claimed easement for the entire 
prescriptive period.  If, at any time during the prescriptive period, the 
claimant’s use of the property is with permission of the owner, the use 
is not “adverse,” and no prescriptive right arises. 
However, if the other elements of prescriptive easement had 
been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the “adverse” nature 
of the use is presumed.  The burden then shifts to the property owner 
to prove that the use was not “adverse,” but permissive. 
25 
1493618.4 
(R. 931.)   
The case was tried to the jury on May 14 and 15, 2018.  (R. 1049-61, 1426-
1820.)  During trial, the court permitted the Hollands’ expert, Lucas Blake, to 
testify concerning its survey of the supposed easement across Harrisons’ property.  
Mr. Blake presented a survey drawing prepared in anticipation of trial, which 
showed the location and contours of the road across the Harrison property as he 
examined it, as well as the supposed location and legal description of its centerline.  
On cross-examination, however, Mr. Blake acknowledged the following:  
a. That Defendant/Counterclaimant Page Holland first contacted 
him in October of 2016 to perform survey work on the Harrison property 
(TR at 156:13-21 (R. 1581)); 
b. That before that time, he had never seen the property, or entered 
into the Willow Basin Subdivision for to view other properties (TR at 157:6-
15 (R. 1582)); 
c. That the survey work presented on direct examination 
(Exhibit 31) was the result of that 2016 visit (TR at 158:13-16 (R. 1583)); 
d. That, in preparation for his testimony, he had never looked at 
other documents or any other data to indicate what the road might have 
looked like in prior years (TR at 158:22-159:8 (R. 1584)); 
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e. That he had never examined any historic photographs or aerials 
(TR at 159:9-13 (R. 1584)); and 
f. He had no information concerning the location, configuration or 
scope of the road across the Harrison property in 1996 (TR at 159:14-16 (R. 
1584)). 
On the second day of trial, after Lucas Blake’s testimony, the court excluded 
testimony from Brad Bunker, the Harrisons’ retained rebuttal expert.  Mr. Bunker 
intended to refute Mr. Blake’s survey testimony on the grounds that it did not 
measure the historic use of the easement during the prescriptive period.  Approved 
Statement of Proceedings as to Which Transcript is Unavailable, dated January 10, 
2019 (Appendix Attachment 3).6  The lower court rejected the admissibility of this 
evidence, observing that “if he really thinks he can do that, he’s intruding into my 
domain . . . .  And he’s – he’s a friend of mine, I like him, I’ve had him do surveys, 
but I would never, never think that that was his responsibility was to decide how 
you – how – how a descriptive [sic] easement is determined.”  TR at 270:12-19 (R. 
1738).   
At the conclusion of evidence, the court instructed the jury on law applicable 
to prescriptive easements.  Incident thereto, the court declined Harrisons’ proposed 
                                           
6 See supra n. 2.   
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Jury Instruction No. 31, and instructed the jury as follows concerning the historic 
use of a prescriptive easement: 
You should determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts 
and circumstances of this case, for SPAH and the Hollands to access 
their property, taking into account the historic use and shape of the 
roadway during its 20 years of use.  You may express your decision in 
terms of the survey, or by determining the width of the easement. 
Jury Instruction No. 27 (R. 1085.)  The court refused outright to instruct the jury 
on the impact of permissive use on the claim of prescriptive easement, declining 
the Harrisons’ proposed Jury Instruction No. 32.  (Id.) 
Following deliberation, the jury returned the special verdict form finding 
that the Hollands had established a prescriptive easement a full 40 feet in width 
along the course of the road described by the Hollands’ expert surveyor, Lucas 
Blake, the jury stating that “this will be consistent with other easements in 
subdivision.”  (R. 1094.) 
The court entered final judgment on the jury’s verdict June 11, 2018.  
(R. 1285-90) (Appendix Exhibit 2).   
On May 18, 2018, the Hollands filed a motion for costs and attorney’s fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.7  By Order dated June 13, 2018, the trial court 
denied the Hollands’ motion and expressed his view of the Harrisons:    
                                           
7  The Hollands’ motion for attorney’s fees also invoked Rule 73, Utah R. Civ. P.; that 
rule, however, merely identifies procedural requirements for seeking an award of 
attorney’s fees, and establishes no grounds therefor. 
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With respect to the vast majority of what was litigated in this case, 
there is no question that plaintiffs were simply asserting, as was their 
right, that defendants either had no easement at all, or that the 
easement was more narrow than defendants desired.  It was obvious 
that plaintiffs were being hardnosed, and certainly not very 
neighborly.  It even seemed to the court that plaintiffs were pursuing a 
course that was unlikely to ultimately earn them anything worthwhile 
on the legal front, while simultaneously damaging their relationships 
and reputations with other cabin owners in the Willow Basin area.  
That is, however, their legal right.   
 
. . .  
 
Plaintiffs may be difficult people, secure, stubborn, and almost 
unreasoning in their opinions and legal stances, but the court cannot 
go so far as to find that they acted in bad faith, i.e., knowing their 
claims would fail or simply to harm defendants.  Their ignorance and 
lack of regard for the views of others act here as shields to a finding of 
bad faith.   
 
(R. 1294.)8  
                                           
8 Although the trial court commented that it was the Harrisons’ legal right to pursue their 
claims, it appears from the court’s statement that the court carries clear bias against the 
Harrisons, regardless of their legal rights and ability to seek relief in a court of law.  First, 
the prescriptive easement claim was the Hollands’ counterclaim and the Harrisons were 
entitled to defend such a claim.  Second, the basis to defend such a claim was well-taken, 
in good faith, and for the reasons explained herein, the Hollands did not meet by clear 
and convincing evidence that they are entitled to the easement awarded (including the 
width based on the historic use).  Finally, this legal action is not the first time that the 
Harrisons, in their view, have not received a fair shake before the trial court.  The 
Harrisons filed an action against individuals, claiming, in short, that they had conspired to 
steal a business that Charlie Harrison had purchased.  See Harrison v. Kratz, et al., Case 
No. 140700031 (filed August 19, 2014 and dismissed July 13, 2016 after the parties 
reached a resolution).  After the trial court ruled against the Harrisons on discovery 
motions, which inevitably would made it very difficult to move prove their claims (see, 
e.g., Case No. 140700031, February 23, 2015 Minutes for Plaintiff Discovery Issues; 
April 7, 2015 Minutes for Second Statement of Discovery Issues; May 14, 2015 Order 
Regarding Plaintiffs’ Second Statement of Discovery Issues), and they ended up settling 
the case.  The Court can take judicial notice of the prior lawsuit as a matter of public 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In ruling that, as a matter of law, Hollands held prescriptive easement rights 
across Harrisons’ property, the court ignored the fact that Hollands failed to 
establish that their use had been continuous and uninterrupted for a full 20 years.  
Before their 20-year prescriptive period lapsed, the Hollands were confronted with 
Charlie Harrison and (later) a county sheriff, summoned by the Harrisons, the 
Hollands were notified that their right to cross Harrisons’ property was not 
acknowledged or acquiesced in.  The Harrisons’ actions in this regard should be 
deemed both a revocation of acquiescence in the use of their property as required 
by governing law, and as the initiation of “legal action” sufficient to interrupt the 
Hollands’ period of prescriptive use. 
The Harrisons presented unrefuted evidence, in response to the Hollands’ 
summary judgment motion, that use of the road across their property was 
(1) outside the intended access roads established by the developer on her recorded 
plat, (2) created for a specific and limited purpose of access to the Holland parcel 
for marketing purposes, and (3) used with her express permission.  While 
acknowledging that the foregoing established “permissive use” prior to the 
                                                                                                                                        
record.  See Utah R. Evid. 201(b); BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ¶ 6, 322 P.3d 
1172 (a court may take judicial notice of public records); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (it is within the 
appellate court’s discretion to take judicial notice of the prior lawsuit). The Harrisons 
respectfully submit to this Court that the trial court did not handle this case and the 
Harrison v. Kratz, et al., case fairly and objectively.      
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Hollands’ acquisition of the Holland parcel, the trial court ruled as a matter of law 
that the change in title of the Holland property converted the “permissive” use to 
an “adverse” use.  This is contrary to governing law, which has long stated that 
once permissive use is shown, the easement claimant must present clear and 
convincing evidence of its conversion to an adverse use. 
If and when a prescriptive right is established, the scope of that right is 
governed and limited by the easement’s historic use.  A trier of fact may not 
burden the servient estate beyond the scope and extent of the use made of the 
easement during the prescriptive period.  In instructing the jury in this case, 
however, the trial court ignored this standard, instructing the jury that they “should 
determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts and circumstances of this 
case, for [Hollands] to access their property . . .”  The jury’s express finding, upon 
special interrogatories, that the easement across the Harrison’s property should be 
40 feet in width – not because such width was historically used during the 
prescriptive period, but because the express, platted easements in the subdivision 
were of that width – evinces the incorrectness of the court’s instruction in this 
regard. 
The trial court improperly permitted testimony from the Hollands’ expert 
land surveyor, Lucas Blake.  Mr. Blake’s opinion testimony, by his own admission, 
was limited to measurement of the road across Harrisons’ property as it existed in 
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October of 2016 – well after the road had been widened and reconfigured by 
Harrisons toward the end of the prescriptive period.  Mr. Blake had consulted no 
historic photographs, no prior survey work, and no other historical evidence which 
would indicate the course or scope of the road crossing Harrisons’ property prior to 
2016.  Rather, Mr. Blake arrived at his opinion concerning the location and scope 
of the easement crossing the Harrisons’ property by locating what he deemed to be 
the edges of the road existing in 2016, and “eyeballing” a centerline based thereon.  
The Hollands offered no evidence at all of the 8-foot-wide roadway’s location in 
1996. 
For the same reason, the court committed prejudicial error in excluding 
testimony from the Harrisons’ designed expert, surveyor Brad Bunker, offered to 
rebut the methodology used by Mr. Blake in arriving at his conclusions.  The jury 
was thus presented with unrebutted expert testimony, based upon what appeared to 
be a scientifically-prepared survey, illustrating what might or might not bear any 
relationship whatever to the historic easement crossing the Harrisons’ property. 
ARGUMENT 
An easement is an interest in real property, typically created by express  
conveyance or reservation.  The exception is the creation of prescriptive easements 
through adverse use.  As prescriptive property interests are in derogation of 
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individual property rights properly conveyed and held, they must meet specified 
standards. 
Elements of an easement by prescription must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence, as set forth in Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 16, 358 
P.3d 346: 
To establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must show, by clear 
and convincing evidence . . . that its use of another’s land was open, 
continuous and adverse under a claim of right for a period of 20 
years . . . . 
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).  See also Buckley v. Cox, 247 P.2d 277, 
279-80 (1952); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998); Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998).  Utah courts have outlined various 
limitations on prescriptive use. 
First, the use must continue uninterrupted, with the acquiescence of the 
servient estate’s owner, for the entire prescriptive period.  While use need not be 
incessant, it must be continuous and acquiesced in for the entire period.  Lunt v. 
Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1953) (more fully discussed below).  
Second, a permitted use (as opposed to an adverse use) may never ripen into 
an easement.  See Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 19, 358 P.3d 346; see also Valcarce, 
961 P.2d at 311-12; Richens v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314 (1966). 
Finally, even if established, a prescriptive easement is limited in scope, and 
may burden the servient estate only to the extent of its historic use for the 20-year 
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prescriptive period; it cannot be expanded, widened or changed beyond the 
limitations of historic use.  Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312 (“the general rule is that the 
extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its historic use during 
the prescriptive period”); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978)  (“It 
has long been the law of this jurisdiction, and elsewhere that the extent of an 
easement acquired by prescription is measured and limited by the use made during 
the prescriptive period.”). 
The trial court’s treatment of the Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim fell 
short under the foregoing standards at three separate points during the case – once 
on summary judgment, once in the skewing of expert testimony at trial, and finally 
in the improper instruction of the jury concerning the scope of the claimed 
easement.  On each of these counts, the verdict and resulting judgment should be 
reversed, and the case remanded either with instructions to find, as a matter of law, 
that no prescriptive easement was established, or for retrial.  
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THE HOLLANDS’ USE OF THE ROAD ACROSS THE 
HARRISONS’ PROPERTY HAD BEEN CONTINUOUS 
AND UNINTERRUPTED FOR A FULL 20 YEARS. 
To begin with, the Hollands failed to present facts on summary judgment 
establishing, as a matter of law, that they or their predecessors-in-interest had been 
using the road across Harrisons’ property for 20 years.  They claim to have 
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established the date of the road’s creation as pre-dating their acquisition of the 
property on August 9, 1996 (and their first visit thereto some days before), 
observing that the road was already in place when they first visited, and apparently 
not new.   
At first blush, the existence of a road as of August 9, 1996 would seem to 
satisfy (albeit by a matter of days) the 20-year prescriptive period requirement, as 
this case was filed September 15, 2016.  There is a clear problem, however, with 
the trial court’s refusal to recognize conduct by the Harrisons that should be 
deemed a revocation of acquiescence in the use of the road, and an interruption of 
the prescriptive period.  That the Harrisons’ conduct did not consist of physically 
barring the road (which they needed for their own access) or filing a civil lawsuit 
should not undermine the efforts they took to prevent the Hollands from using the 
road.   
Based on Page Holland’s account in the Sheriff’s Report, it is clear that in 
June 2016, months before the 20-year period’s conclusion, Charlie Harrison and 
Stan Holland had a confrontation on the property in which Mr. Harrison challenged 
Mr. Holland’s use of the roadway.  The confrontation went beyond simple verbal 
notice; the dispute escalated between them to the point of calling in a law 
enforcement officer.  This June 2016 confrontation is not disputed: it is reflected in 
a subsequent police report created in September that year, and sworn to by Page 
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Holland.  Moreover, the County Sheriff’s Report reflects a continuing course of 
conduct between the parties beginning June 2016 and through September 2016, 
which resulted in the Harrisons filing the present action.   
Given the foregoing, there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue 
whether the Hollands’ prescriptive use of undetermined portions of the Harrisons’ 
property was not interrupted prior to the day of its 20th anniversary, which should, 
at the very least, have defeated summary judgment.  This is so for two reasons. 
A. The Harrisons’ conduct evidenced clear intent that they did not 
acquiesce in the Hollands’ use of their property for the entire 
prescriptive period. 
The theoretical underpinnings of prescriptive rights in Utah were explained 
in the case of Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535 (Utah 1953), which remains good law 
in Utah.  Therein, the Court considered whether there was “sufficient evidence of 
[an] adverse user for a period of twenty years to sustain the trial court’s finding of 
a prescriptive easement.”  Id. at 537.  In considering the question, the court stated 
the following concerning the nature of prescriptive easement rights: 
. . . [P]roof of continuous use for the prescriptive period, openly and 
with knowledge of the landowner, was sufficient to raise a 
presumption of grant, which in effect was a positive rule of law.  The 
fact that the grantor with knowledge of such use, makes no protest 
against it is proof of his recognition of a claim of right in the grantee.  
In other words, it is conclusively presumed from the landowner’s 
acquiescence for the defined period of time in the other’s user of his 
land, he having the right and power to stop such user, that it is a 
rightful user.  
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Id. at 537 (emphasis added).  Lunt makes clear, in short, that prescriptive rights 
arise from the acquiescence of the servient estate owner.  More recently, in the 
case of Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, 397 P.3d 686, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the establishment of adversity of use by the acquiescence of the servient 
estate owner.  See id. at ¶ 25.     
Neither Lunt nor any of the cases handed down in Utah since that time have 
clarified exactly what form of “protest” defeats the presumption of acquiescence 
for purposes of easement by prescription; clearly, though, the trial court was of the 
opinion that, short of the filing of a lawsuit or the physical blocking of a road and 
courting violent confrontation, “acquiescence” could not be revoked.  Other courts, 
however, have considered this issue and have generally held that any conduct that 
clearly manifests a revocation of acquiescence is sufficient.   
In the case of Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals considered a claim of easement by prescription, 
inhering in the public, over a dirt road which the defendant claimed to be private.  
In its ruling, the court of appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, what 
conduct on a landowner’s part would interrupt the easement claimant’s use 
sufficiently to end the prescriptive period.  After a discussion of various cases from 
other jurisdictions, the court then concluded the following: 
. . . [G]iven that prescriptive easements – by their nature – are founded 
on acquiescence . . . we find that clear conduct indicating that a 
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property owner is not acquiescing as to a prospective easement 
owner’s claim of right should rightfully be considered as ending the 
running of a prescriptive easement period.  Moreover, we believe that 
our decision here is consistent with our state’s long-held policy of 
disfavoring prescriptive easements.  We further conclude that it will 
serve to discourage the type of violent confrontations that could result 
from forcing a property owner to “successfully” defend his right to 
keep others off of his land. 
209 S.W.3d at 481 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Pittman v. Lowther, 610 S.E.2d 479 (S.C. 2005), the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina concluded that “[i]n addition to physical barriers, verbal 
threats which convey to the dominant landowner the impression the servient 
landowner does not acquiesce in the use of land, are also sufficient to interrupt the 
prescriptive period.”  Id. at 481.     
Next, in Kelley v. Westover, 938 S.W.2d 235 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997), the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals held that “‘any unambiguous act of the owner of the 
land which evinces his intention to exclude others from the uninterrupted use of the 
right claimed breaks its continuity so as to prevent the acquisition of an easement 
therein by prescription.”  Id. at 236-37 (citing 25 Am. Jur.2d, Easements and 
Licenses, § 69 (1996)).     
In Rice v. Miller, 238 N.W.2d 609 (1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court 
considered a landowner’s claim that the prescriptive rights of the easement 
claimant had been interrupted before the end of the necessary prescriptive period.  
Stating (as did the Utah Supreme Court in Lunt) that “‘[t]he very foundation of the 
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establishment of a right to an easement by prescription is the acquiescence by the 
owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied upon to establish such prescriptive 
right’”, the Minnesota court explained that “‘[a]cquiescence, regardless of what it 
might mean otherwise, means, when used in this connection, passive conduct on 
the part of the owner of the servient estate [c]onsisting of failure on his part to 
assert his paramount rights against the invasion thereof by the adverse user.”  Id. at 
611 (citations omitted).  Based thereon, the court concluded that various verbal and 
physical acts, by the landowner, defeated the prescriptive easement claim.  Id. at 
611-12. 
The analysis taken by the courts in the foregoing cases is commendable.  
Given the dependence of prescriptive rights on a landowner’s acquiescence in the 
adverse use of his property, overt actions clearly evincing an intent to end that 
acquiescence should be deemed sufficient to end the prescriptive period.  The 
alternative is a policy that compels landowners to engage in potentially-violent 
confrontations, as a prerequisite to the defense of property rights – a “law of the 
range” mentality which should not persist in Utah jurisprudence in the 21st 
Century.  In other areas of real property law, courts have long since channeled 
parties away from self-help remedies (e.g., the prohibition against self-help in 
repossessing demised premises rather than invoking unlawful detainer process, see, 
e.g., Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985)).   
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In sum, it is in the interests of modern-day common sense and civility that in 
the face of a dispute over the use of real property, an individual may refer a dispute 
to law enforcement, before either barricading a road or lawyering up.   
As of June 2016, there could be no doubt that the Harrisons did not 
acquiesce in the Hollands’ continued use of the Harrisons’ property as their 
driveway.  Law enforcement was contacted.  To demand more of the Harrisons in 
protection of their rights is to advocate a breach of the peace or to encourage the 
very sort of costly and time-consuming litigation in which the parties now find 
themselves. 
B. At a minimum, a fact question exists whether the parties’ invocation of 
law enforcement intervention in June of 2016 constituted the initiation 
of “legal proceedings,” sufficient to interrupt the Hollands’ claim of 
prescriptive use. 
Section 459 of the Restatement (First) of Property provides, in part, that 
adverse use is uninterrupted with the aid of “legal proceedings.”  While a Utah 
court has not issued a decision directly on this point, even if this Court agrees that, 
short of blocking a road physically and courting violence between neighbors, the 
owner of real property must initiate “legal proceedings” to determine and proscribe 
easement rights (see 4 Tiffany on Real Property (2017 ed.), § 1206 (“The weight of 
authority is . . . that mere remonstrances or protests by the landowner will not 
prevent the acquisition of a right by prescription, in the absence of any physical 
interference with the user, or legal proceedings based thereon”)), there is no logical 
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reason to limit the type of qualifying “legal proceedings” to the expensive and 
lengthy processes of a full-blown civil action.  Such a lofty standard would be 
counterintuitive to the average landowner, who would understandably presume that 
calling the police on a trespasser would be both an adequate, and the most 
responsible, course of action.   
Again, it is a matter of first impression in Utah whether the summoning law 
enforcement should not be deemed a sufficient invocation of legal redress to 
interrupt prescriptive use of private property.  The Harrisons submit, though, that 
where an unrepresented party invokes the intervention of law enforcement 
officials, is advised to obtain legal counsel, attempts to negotiate a resolution, and 
files a civil action (only when such attempts prove fruitless), “legal proceedings” 
should be deemed to have been initiated – specifically, when law enforcement was 
called.  Certainly, the calling in of the county sheriff to investigate a claim of 
unauthorized entry is just as effective to put the easement claimant on notice that 
the landowner did not consent to the use as is the filing of a formal civil complaint 
and service of a summons.  In either instance, the landowner has invoked the 
processes of law to place the easement claimant on notice that acquiescence is at 
an end.  (For that matter, physical obstruction of the easement, which all courts 
recognize as interrupting a prescriptive use, conveys no more emphatic message of 
non-acquiescence than does calling in the local law enforcement officers.) 
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Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the trial 
court’s finding of easement by prescription as a matter of law. 
C. The trial court should have balanced the equities of the relief sought – 
specifically, the Hollands’ obligation to do equity before seeking equity.    
It should be noted that the Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim was not 
because of necessity; the Hollands are not landlocked and can build their own road 
to their home.  But instead, they claimed that they had the right to use the 
Harrisons’ property as their private driveway and – despite being warned and 
despite the visit by the sheriff in June of 2016 – continued to trespass across the 
property while the Harrisons were in the process of retaining legal counsel in an 
attempt to resolve this matter (without resorting to litigation).  In so doing, the 
Hollands managed to avoid an actual civil filing until a few days past the 20th 
anniversary of their first visit to their lot.   
This is a suit in equity and those who seek equity must do equity.  The 
Hollands were on notice, by June of 2016, that they were not welcome to cross the 
Harrison property.  They knew this.  They should not have been permitted to use 
their disregard of that intelligence as a sword to establish prescriptive rights. 
Moreover, the trial court should have balanced the equities, determined whether 
the Hollands, seeking equity, have done equity, and reserved the matter for trial. 
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POINT II: ANY USE OF THE ROAD WAS PERMISSIVE. 
As already noted, claims of prescriptive easement must be based on adverse 
use.  If the other elements of easement by prescription are met, there is an initial 
presumption that the use of the easement was adverse; however, proof offered by 
the owner of the servient estate that use was by permission defeats the prescriptive 
easement claim.  Where the use is shown to be “under” the owner, rather than 
“against” the owner, Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 715 (1946), no prescriptive 
use is made out.  Notably (and contrary to the trial court’s presumption in this case, 
see below), if the owner of the servient estate demonstrates that the use was 
initially permissive, the use remains permissive, and no prescriptive right matures 
unless it is thereafter converted to an adverse use.  As soon as permissive use is 
shown, the burden shifts back to the claimant to show that the use became adverse, 
and continued so for the prescriptive period:  
If the owner of the servient estate “sustains that burden and 
overcomes the presumption by proof that the use was initially 
permissive, then the burden of going forward with evidence and of 
ultimate persuasion shifts back to the claimant to show that the use 
[again] became adverse and continued for the prescriptive period.” 
 
Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 19, 358 P.3d 346 (citing Richens v. Struhs, 412 
P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966)); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311-
312 (Utah 1998); see also Bruce and Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in 
Land (2018 ed.) at § 5:9, p. 5-45 (“When use of a servient estate is initially 
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permissive, the use will confer a prescriptive right only if the user subsequently 
makes a direct assertion of a claim hostile to the owner.”).  
In support of cross motions for summary judgment, the Harrisons relied on 
the declaration testimony of Janice Hawley, the owner of the Willow Basin 
Subdivision from before the time of its creation in 1994 and the Harrisons’ 
predecessor-in-interest in the Harrison’ property.  Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7 (R. 309-
10.)  Her sworn statement was that, at the time she conveyed the Hollands’ parcel 
to Manuel and Ginger Torres (the Hollands’ predecessors-in-interest), she gave 
permission for use of the roadway across the Harrison parcel (title to which she 
retained until its conveyance to the Harrisons in 2008) for the limited purpose of 
permitting the Torreses to access the neighboring parcel for marketing purposes.  
Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, (R. 310).  Her intent was always that permanent access to all 
parcels of the subdivision be via roads reflected on the plat.  Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 5, 9 
(R. 310).  The use of the road across the Harrison property, in other words, was 
permissive during her ownership of that parcel, for the use specified.  This was 
likewise Mr. Day’s understanding, both in deposition and at trial.  The Hollands 
made no showing whatsoever of a point in time at which their permitted use of a 
limited temporary access road became adverse, as required by governing case law.   
The trial court, however, completely disregarded this failing, concluding as a 
matter of law on summary judgment that the change of ownership of the Holland 
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property automatically converted the use of the road to an adverse use, without any 
other showing.  On that same basis, the trial court refused Harrisons’ proffered 
instruction on permissive use.  Proposed Jury Instruction No. 32 (R. 931).9  
Remarkably, the trial court’s position in this regard was supported by no citation of 
any authority either by the court or by the Hollands, in derogation of the legal 
standard established by Jacob, Richens and Valcarce.  The law, in fact, is precisely 
the opposite: only the transfer of the servient estate extinguishes the permissive use 
and renders it adverse.  See generally Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land (2018 ed.) at § 5:9, p. 5-46, and cases cited therein.10 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT THE SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT WHICH IT 
HAD DECLARED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
LIMITED TO ITS HISTORIC USE. 
Where an easement by prescription is determined to exist, its location and 
scope are established and limited by one thing only: the nature and scope of the 
historic use made thereof by the claimant.  The governing standard was articulated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the 1943 decision of Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 
696 (Utah 1943):  “[A] prescriptive right would be limited by the nature and extent 
                                           
9 Each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of 
the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it; if a rational jury 
could find a factual basis in the evidence to support the theory, the trial court is obligated 
to give the instruction.  State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 29, 309 P.3d 1160. 
10 Apparently, only Maryland follows the rule stated by the trial court herein.  Rupli v. 
South Mtn. Heritage Soc., Inc., 202 Md. App. 673, 33 A.3d 1055 (2011). 
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of use during the prescriptive period.”  Id. at 701.  In Harvey v. Haights Bench 
Irrigation Co., 318 P.2d 343 (Utah 1957), Utah Supreme Court expanded on and 
explained the reason for the “historic use” limitation: 
In determining the nature of this prescriptive easement, its extent and 
limitations, the burdens and benefits which it confers upon each 
estate, we must look to the nature of the use which existed during the 
prescriptive period.  Since the right has its inception in the use during 
that time, its extent and limitations, its burdens and benefits are 
determined by the nature of that use and the understandings of the 
parties thereto.  Thus any use which would have probably been 
interrupted by the owner of the servient estate had the owner of the 
dominant estate attempted such use prior to the expiration of the 
prescriptive period, is a use which places a greater burden on the 
servient estate and therefore is beyond the prescriptive right acquired 
by the dominant estate. 
318 P.2d 349 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).  In 1998, the Utah Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the “historic use” limitation on prescriptive easements in 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d 305, supra: 
The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is 
measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive 
period.  
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).  On March 30, 2017, the Utah Court of Appeals once 
again reaffirmed the “historic use” limitation, and gave an extensive explanation 
thereof.  In Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, 397 P.3d 686, the Court of Appeals 
took up a lower court judgment granting prescriptive easement rights over a 
neighboring property for use of ingress, egress and parking.  In reversing (in part) 
the lower court’s ruling, the Court noted that the prescriptive easement is a “non-
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possessory interest” which may not be applied to divest the landowner of 
ownership rights in the underlying property: 
An easement is an incorporeal right. . . .  It is a property interest that 
consists of the privilege to merely use—rather than occupy or 
possess—the land of another for a circumscribed, limited purpose. . . .  
“A prescriptive easement does not result in ownership, but allows 
only use of property belonging to another for a limited purpose, one 
that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the 
owner. . . .  
As a result, a successful prescriptive easement claimant does not (and, 
in fact, cannot) gain the right to occupy or possess the landowner's 
property.  Indeed, the claimed right to use may not be inconsistent 
with either the [landowner's] ownership interest or the general 
property right of the owner, or the general use of the property by the 
owner . . . Rather, the rights of the easement holder and the landowner 
must be capable of being balanced so as to afford each the ability to 
“use and enjoy” the rights attendant to use the property for a limited 
purpose on the one hand and ownership on the other. 
Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 (internal quotations omitted).  The Court then reaffirmed the general 
rule that by reason of the foregoing, “the extent of a prescriptive easement is 
measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period,” and adding 
that “[t]he easement holder may not be granted a right ‘which places a greater 
burden on the [landowner]’” than during the prescriptive period.  Id. at ¶ 58 (citing 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312).  Based thereon, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s findings and order as they related to the widths of the claimants’ 
prescriptive rights, holding that “these orders are inconsistent with the usage that 
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forms the basis of the Judd’s prescriptive right—using the Driveway for ingress 
and egress purposes.”  Id. at ¶ 65.   
In this case, it was established both on dispositive motions and at trial that, 
20 years before this action started, the road across the Harrison property was a 
single blade, or 8 feet, in width.  No competent evidence of any sort was offered of 
its original course.  By the Hollands’ own evidence, neither the width nor the 
course of the road changed until after 2008, when the Harrisons acquired their 
property.  As such, governing case law should have limited the Hollands’ remedy 
to an 8-foot-wide easement (assuming the Hollands managed to establish the 
location thereof, which they did not, as explained in Points IV and V below). 
Yet, the court disregarded the Harrisons’ proffered instruction regarding the 
historic use of prescriptive easements, substituting therefor a broad and vague 
instruction that, if once a prescriptive easement had been found (which, in this 
case, had been done on summary judgment), the jury was at liberty to decide 
where, and how large, such an easement should be, given the “reasonable” needs 
of the dominant estate holders: 
You should determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts 
and circumstances of this case, for SPAH and the Hollands to access 
their property, taking into account the historic use and shape of the 
roadway during its 20 years of use.  You may express your decision in 
terms of the survey, or by determining the width of the easement. 
Instruction No. 27 (R. 1085) (emphasis added). 
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Instruction No. 27 did not accurately state the law.  It imposed a much 
vaguer, more flexible standard than that permitted by governing cases.  It also used 
the words “reasonably necessary,” a standard unsupported by and contrary to law.   
As a direct and clear result, the jury determined that the Hollands’ 
prescriptive rights encumbered the Harrison property to the extent of a full 40-foot 
width, as “this will be consistent with other easements in subdivision.”  The jury 
was impermissibly given the leeway to impose what it saw as a simple and 
evenhanded, “reasonable” resolution to the whole case:  since all the other 
easements in Willow Basin Subdivision (even though they had been established by 
the developer as access roads, and had been given by express grant) were 40 feet 
in width, so should the road across Harrisons’ property be 40 feet in width.  But 
governing law does not permit the jury to impose such a standard.  The court’s 
instruction misled them into believing it to be a viable solution – a result that the 
court sought. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED 
EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM THE HOLLANDS’ 
SURVEYOR, LUCAS BLAKE. 
Before trial began, Harrisons challenged the methodology of Hollands’ 
retained expert surveyor, Lucas Blake, on a motion in limine.  (R. 690-700).  The 
Harrisons based their motion on the Deposition of Lucas Blake (“Blake Depo”): 
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a. Mr. Blake was first contacted by the Hollands in the summer of 
2016.11  Blake Depo at 25:1-6 (R. 717).  Prior to that time, he had never seen 
or visited the parties’ respective properties, and had no knowledge thereof.  
Blake Depo at 26:19-25; 28:5-16 (R. 717).     
b. Mr. Blake visited the property only once, in the company of 
Defendant Page Holland, within a month or so of his first being contacted.  
Blake Depo at 28:18-20 (R. 717).   
c. During his single visit to the property in the summer of 2016, 
Mr. Blake conducted measurements from the edge of the road as it then 
existed.  Blake Depo at 29:19-30; 19 (R. 718, 715).  He then estimated the 
centerline of the existing road as of 2016 (by “eyeballing”).  Blake Depo 
at 31:7-14, 32:2-7 (R. 718).   
d. Mr. Blake did no other research in connection with his 
anticipated testimony.  Blake Depo at 34:6-16 (R. 719).  He later confirmed 
that he had performed no other investigation, research or examination 
                                           
11 As noted, Charlie Harrison filed a lawsuit in 2014, styled: Harrison v. Kratz, et al., 
Case No. 140700031.  See supra n. 8.  Lucas Blake was initially a named defendant in 
this action.  See Case No. 140700031, Docket & Complaint.  Then, after he was 
dismissed from the lawsuit, he was deposed on May 29, 2015.  See Case No. 140700031, 
Amended Notice of Deposition.  It is therefore no surprise that Mr. Blake was the 
Hollands’ expert witness:  His survey in the summer of 2016 was against the backdrop of 
litigation between him and Mr. Harrison.    
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concerning the location, scope, course, or dimensions of the easement before 
the summer of 2016: 
Q.  All right.  Other than the one visit to the property when you 
took the measurements you have described, did you do any other 
examination, research or data gathering to prepare Exhibit 40? . . . 
A.  Oh.  No.   
Blake Depo at 34:1-16 (R. 719).    
e. In follow-up questioning, Mr. Blake reaffirmed that his 
knowledge and work related to the layout of the road in the summer of 2016, 
and that he had no information, direct or indirect, concerning its location, 
course or scope at any time prior thereto:   
Q.  Okay.  So it would be fair to say that Exhibit 40 and 
Exhibit 41, the first page of Exhibit 41, both illustrate the road as it 
existed in the summer of 2016? 
A.  Correct. 
Q.  And, again, you’d never been to the property before the 
summer of 2016? 
A.  Correct. 
Q.  So you don’t know what was there before that? 
A.  No. 
Blake Depo at 37:18-38:3 (R. 720).   
f. Mr. Blake further admitted that his survey work measured only 
the flat of the road, and included no tap or toe of any slopes.  Blake Depo at 
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40:10-19 (R. 720).  He had no idea when the road was graded to the 
condition in which he surveyed it.  Blake Depo at 41:6-9 (R. 721). 
g. Toward the conclusion of his deposition, Mr. Blake was offered, 
and accepted as correct, the following summary of his testimony: 
Q.  Okay.  So let’s back up, then.  You went to the property in the 
summer of 2016, you took your measurements, you looked at the 
Keogh land survey on file with the county of the subdivision that 
this is in, and you prepared the legal description which is the 
second page of Exhibit 41.  Did you then deliver that to the 
Hollands? 
A.  Through email, yeah.  
 Blake Depo at 36:1-8 (R. 719).   
The trial court denied the motion in a brief and intemperate memorandum 
decision.  (R. 839.)  The lower court’s ruling in this regard mirrored its 
misperception of the scope and location of an easement established by prescription, 
and permitted expert testimony on the estimated centerline of the road crossing the 
Harrison property in 2016 – not the road that existed in 1996.  In carrying out its 
role as gatekeeper for expert testimony, the trial court should have excluded 
Mr. Blake’s testimony entirely. 
Before a designated expert witness can present opinion evidence to a jury, 
there must be a threshold showing to the court (as “gatekeeper”) that the proposed 
expert opinion testimony reliably assists the trier of fact to determine the ultimate 
issue in controversy: 
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Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the 
basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the 
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony  
(1) are reliable,  
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
Rule 702(b), Utah R. Evid.  Rule 702(b), revised in 2011 to clarify prior confusion 
under the rule and interpretive case law, presently requires not only that the expert 
be competent, that his methods be recognized or otherwise shown reliable, and that 
his methodology be sound, but that the theory and methodology be properly 
applied to the facts of the case.  Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad, 2001 UT 77, ¶ 19, 31 P.3d 557.   
The Harrisons did not challenge Mr. Blake’s credentials as a land surveyor; 
nor did they contend that his survey methodology was flawed or incorrectly 
performed when he visited the properties at issue in this case in the summer of 
2016.  Instead, the Harrisons contended that Mr. Blake measured the wrong thing.  
The issue reserved for trial by the trial court’s summary judgment ruling was the 
scope and extent of an easement created by 20 years’ uninterrupted and adverse 
use, not a roadway more recently configured by the Harrisons.  As such, 
Mr. Blake’s methodology was incorrectly applied to the facts of the case and 
should not have been admitted under Rule 702(b).   
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As noted under Point III, above, even when established, a prescriptive right 
may not morph into something more than time and use have established.  At trial, 
the Hollands (as claimants of prescriptive rights across the Harrison property) bore 
the burden of proving this issue by clear and convincing evidence as to each 
element of the claim.  Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 397 P.3d 686.   
The expert testimony of Lucas Blake made no pretense of establishing the 
historic, 20-year-long use of the easement claimed by the Hollands.  Instead, he 
measured the scope and centerline (which he “eyeballed” from the edges of the 
then-existing road in 2016) based on observations and measurements taken long 
after the claimed prescriptive period had started – in fact, at approximately the time 
this lawsuit was initiated. By his own admission, Mr. Blake consulted no county 
records other than the subdivision plat map on record with the county recorder’s 
office.  He reviewed no historic aerial photographs.  He consulted no prior surveys 
of the property.  He interviewed no residents or owners concerning the changes in 
the road over time.  He made no attempt to adjust his measurements based on 
representations or evidence from any source concerning the original scope and 
course of the roadway.  As such, Mr. Blake’s survey work had no bearing on the 
facts of the case to be determined by the jury.   
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Mr. Blake’s expert opinion on the 2016 configuration of the Hollands’ 
claimed prescriptive easement was also irrelevant.  Rule 401, Utah R. Evid., 
provides the following: 
Evidence is relevant if: 
(a) it has any tendency to make any fact more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 
For those reasons set out above, the location of the road in 2016 is of no 
consequence in determining the scope of a prescriptive right which, by law, must 
have ripened (if at all) during a 20-year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit.  
Mr. Blake’s testimony did not speak to this issue at all; he had nothing to offer the 
trier of fact. 
Yet the trial court permitted his testimony (and permitted its presentation to 
the jury unrebutted, as explained below in Point V).  As such, the jury was 
presented with unanswered testimony regarding the location of the easement’s 
supposed historic centerline, which they clearly took as gospel.  Rule 403, Utah R. 
Evid., provides that: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:  
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
The jury was presented with an illustration from a certified land surveyor showing 
the scope and course of an easement (albeit as modified during the course of the 
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prescriptive period, and not measured until 2016) and was thereafter instructed to 
determine the scope and course of that easement (see supra Point III).  The jury’s 
response to the verdict form evinces the resulting confusion:  the jurors clearly 
misunderstood the determination that they were called upon to make.  Visuals of 
any sort, and certainly those from a licensed land surveyor – backed up with 
unrebutted foundational testimony regarding measurements and methods – 
unquestionably carry powerful and disproportionate weight with a jury.  The jury 
clearly deemed Mr. Lucas’ drawing as determinative of the easement’s centerline 
and course even though the fact that they were to determine (the historic location 
and extent of any prescriptive use) was nowhere shown to them. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY FROM BRAD BUNKER, 
HARRISONS’ RETAINED EXPERT. 
Having erroneously determined that Mr. Blake’s testimony was admissible 
and relevant, the trial court compounded its error by excluding rebuttal testimony 
from the Harrisons’ retained expert, Brad Bunker.  Mr. Bunker was prepared to 
address, as a qualified land surveyor whose credentials matched Mr. Blake’s own, 
why Mr. Blake’s approach to establishing the centerline of the supposed 
prescriptive easement was flawed, in that he had consulted no historic records to 
determine its location, but had measured backward by “eyeballing” the centerline 
of the road which he found on the property in 2016.  Without explanation, the trial 
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court concluded that, while Mr. Blake’s testimony concerning the location of the 
easement’s centerline and scope was entirely proper, Mr. Bunker’s proffered 
testimony (which simply challenged Mr. Blake’s methodology) would impinge 
upon the role of the court in establishing the elements of prescriptive easement.  
This was simply not the case.  The trial court had permitted Mr. Blake to present 
forensic testimony concerning the location and course of a prescriptive easement; it 
should likewise have permitted the Harrisons to present expert testimony 
challenging the legitimacy and reliability of Mr. Blake’s methodology.  That 
rebuttal expert testimony is presumed admissible when an expert has testified in 
the opposing party’s case-in-chief, see Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 
1993).  
CONCLUSION 
A review of the record as a whole in this matter presents an inescapable 
conclusion:  the trial court prejudged the case.  It determined that the Hollands 
were to have a prescriptive easement across the Harrisons’ property, which would 
consist of the road as it existed in 2016 and thereafter.  To this end, the court: 
(1) improperly granted summary judgment as to the existence of an 
easement by prescription;  
(2) displayed a decidedly hostile animus toward the Harrisons in their 
attempts to dispute this ruling;  
(3) improperly admitted expert testimony establishing the location and scope 
of the easement as the court plainly wished it found;  
57 
1493618.4 
(4) displayed an equally hostile animus toward the Harrisons in their 
attempts to dispute the admissibility of the expert testimony as to the single 
issue remaining;  
(5) improperly excluded rebuttal testimony challenging the survey methods 
used; and  
(6) improperly instructed the jury as to the law applicable to the sole 
determination entrusted to them:  the scope and location of the easement.   
As a result, the jury returned a verdict saddling the Harrison property with a 
40-foot wide easement servicing the Holland property—an easement which has 
never existed on that property, and certainly did not exist for the entire 20 years 
preceding this case’s filing. 
In fact, the Harrisons timely challenged the Hollands’ continued trespass 
onto the Harrison property for any purpose by notifying Hollands that Harrisons 
did not acquiescence in that use and calling the Grand County Sheriff’s office to 
remedy the situation.  Prior to the Harrisons’ acquisition of their property in 2008, 
moreover, the prior owner thereof, Janice Hawley, was allowing the Hollands’ use 
(like that of their predecessors-in-interest) by express permission.  Even if an 
easement did exist, moreover, its scope was limited to the 20-year use:  an 8-foot-
wide, single-blade roadway.  At no point in the trial did the Hollands – who bore 
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence – establish the location or 
course of that path at all. 
Based on the foregoing, the Harrisons request that the court’s ruling on the 
Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim be reserved and, in the alternative, 
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remanded to the trial court for retrial on all issues relevant to the Hollands’ claim 
of easement by prescription. 
DATED this 15th day of February 2019. 
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